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Insurance
by Bradley S. Wolff*
Stephen L. Cotter"
and Stephen M. Schatz***
I.

INTRODUCTION

In this survey period from June 1, 2008 to May 31, 2009,' the courts
stepped in to help those injured in motor vehicle incidents collect
additional sums from uninsured motorist carriers even when the
available uninsured motorist (UM) coverage may be equal to or less than
the tortfeasor's liability coverage. Another notable development is found
in a string of cases involving victims of mortgage fraud. The victims
prevailed in all three cases.
II.

AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE

Once again, uninsured motorist coverage provided the most significant
developments in Georgia automobile insurance law during the survey
period. The Georgia Supreme Court reversed a decision reported last
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L. Cotter et al., Insurance,Annual Survey of GeorgiaLaw, 60 MERCER L. REV. 191 (2008).
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year.2 The Georgia Court of Appeals continued to modify UM practice
with a pair of decisions concerning health care liens.3 A variety of other
issues were addressed, but no cases in this survey period dealt with the
4
application of last year's overhaul of the UM statute.
A.

UninsuredMotorist Coverage

1. Joint Release Redux. When a husband and wife both bring
personal injury claims arising from a collision and accept a liability
insurer's single "per person" limit for bodily injury and jointly execute
a limited liability release, are they eligible for additional recovery from
their UM carrier, or have they barred such recovery by each accepting
less than the total available liability coverage? That was the question
answered by the supreme court in Thompson v. Allstate Insurance Co.'
As reported in last year's survey article,' "Richard and Laura
Thompson... brought suit against Randall Bacon for physical injuries
which they sustained as a result of a vehicular collision."7 The
Thompsons "also served Allstate Insurance Company and Georgia Farm
Bureau Casualty Insurance Company ... in their capacities as
underinsured motorist (UM) carriers."' Bacon was covered by a liability
insurance policy with bodily injury liability limits of $100,000 per person
and $300,000 per accident.9 Pursuant to section 33-24-41.1 of the
Official Code of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.)Y° and in exchange for
$100,000 paid by the liability carrier, the Thompsons "individually and
as husband and wife executed a limited release of Bacon and the liability
their claims
insurer." " The Thompsons then sought to further pursue
12
for Mr. Thompson's injuries against the UM carriers.
Allstate and Georgia Farm Bureau "filed motions for summary
judgment on the ground that the release established that neither [of the
Thompsons] had exhausted the available liability coverage" because they

2.

See Thompson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 285 Ga. 24, 673 S.E.2d 227 (2009), rev'g 291 Ga.

App. 465, 662 S.E.2d 164 (2008), cited in Cotter et al., supra note 1, at 203-05.
3. See Adams v, State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 298 Ga. App. 249, 679 S.E.2d 726
(2009); Toomer v. Allstate Ins. Co., 292 Ga. App. 60, 663 S.E.2d 763 (2008).

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

See generally Cotter et al., supra note 1, at 199-201.
285 Ga. 24, 673 S.E.2d 227 (2009).
See generally Cotter et al., supra note 1, at 203-05.
Thompson, 285 Ga. at 24-25, 673 S.E.2d at 228.
Id. at 25, 673 S.E.2d at 228.
Id., 673 S.E.2d at 229.
O.C.G.A. § 33-24-41.1 (2005).
Thompson, 285 Ga. at 25, 673 S.E.2d at 229.
Id.
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jointly received only the amount available for bodily injury to one
person.13 The Thompsons argued that all of the payment was for Mr.
Thompson's bodily injury claim and that Mrs. Thompson's bodily injury
claim was abandoned.14 "The trial court granted the motions for
summary judgment as to Mrs. Thompson's claims ... but denied the
motions as to Mr. Thompson's claim." 5 The court of appeals reversed,
holding that the "release unambiguously showed that Mrs. Thompson
necessarily received at least a portion of the consideration for the
release, thereby establishing that Mr. Thompson did not exhaust the
liability coverage." 6 The supreme court reversed the judgment of the
court of appeals.17
The supreme court reiterated that a party must exhaust available
liability coverage (and execute a limited release in accordance with
O.C.G.A. § 33-24-41.1 when the limits are paid in settlement) to recover
under a UM policy.18 The court held that the release was in compliance with the limited release statute and did not unambiguously show
that Mr. Thompson settled for less than the bodily injury limit.' 9 The
supreme court noted that because loss of consortium claims are part of
the spouse's bodily injury claim for the "per person" limit, the liability
insurer's total payment for the husband's bodily injury and the wife's
loss of consortium claim added together could have accounted for the
payment of the per person limit.2 0 In addition, the court concluded that
the joint release did not necessarily indicate that Mrs. Thompson
received a portion of the proceeds for her own claims.2 1 "Instead, her
promise to release all non-UM claims may have been in return for
payment to her husband of the liability limits for his bodily injury claim
.... Therefore, the release [was] ambiguous as to whether Mr.
Thompson settled his bodily injury claim for less than the available
liability coverage."22 The Thompsons' parol evidence was held to be
admissible to show that the payment was in fact only for Mr. Thompson's claims, and therefore, the judgment of the court of appeals was
reversed.23

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id. at 25-26, 673 S.E.2d at 229.
Id. at 25, 673 S.E.2d at 229.
Id.
Id. at 26, 673 S.E.2d at 229.
Id. at 29, 673 S.E.2d at 231.
Id. at 26, 673 S.E.2d at 229 (citing O.C.GA. § 33-24-41.1).
See id., 673 S.E.2d at 229-30.
Id. at 27, 673 S.E.2d at 230.
Id. at 28, 673 S.E.2d at 231.
Id.
Id. at 29, 673 S.E.2d at 231.
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The court of appeals decision caused a bit of consternation about how
to resolve claims with liability insurers that insisted upon a release from
an uninjured spouse along with the injured spouse. The supreme court's
decision, along with the use of careful wording in future release
agreements, should alleviate further concerns in this practice area.
2. Medical Care Creates UM Exposure Despite Equal Limits. In
2004 the supreme court held in Thurman v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co.' 4 that a tortfeasor's liability insurance
coverage is "reduced," and federal agencies or insurers have claims for
reimbursement, if the injured claimant was a federal employee.2" This
decision was unusual but seemingly limited to a fairly rare set of facts.
We say "unusual" because the fact that a federal health or workers'
compensation insurer is entitled to repayment for the cost of treating an
injury does not in any literal or logical sense "reduce" the tortfeasor's
liability coverage. And we say "rare" because there are not many cases
involving federal employees as plaintiffs injured in motor vehicle
accidents.
The court of appeals, however, does not think the Thurman rule is
either unusual or rarely applicable. In two cases decided this survey
period, the court expanded Thurman to apply when (1) the injured
claimant is a Medicare beneficiary, and (2) treatment costs are not paid
by anyone and a health care lien is filed.
In Toomer v. Allstate Insurance Co.,26 the issue was whether Medicare's right to reimbursement "reduced" the available liability insurance
limit such that the claimant's UM carrier could be called upon to pay.27
According to the court,
Janie Toomer sued Edgar Rosenberry for injuries she suffered in an
automobile collision that [she claimed] was his fault. She served her
uninsured motorist... carrier, Allstate Insurance Company, with the
complaint. Toomer later settled with Rosenberry's liability insurance
carrier, [United States
Automobile Association (USAA)], for the amount
28
of his policy limit.

Allstate moved to dismiss, arguing that because Toomer's UM policy
limit was equal to Rosenberry's liability policy limit, there was no issue
of an uninsured or underinsured motorist. The trial court granted

24.
25.
26.
27.

278 Ga. 162, 598 S.E.2d 448 (2004).
Id. at 165, 598 S.E.2d at 451.
292 Ga. App. 60, 663 S.E.2d 763 (2008).
Id. at 61, 663 S.E.2d at 764.

28. Id. at 60, 663 S.E.2d at 764.
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Allstate's motion.2 9 Toomer appealed, claiming that the trial court
"erred because the proceeds of her settlement with USAA [would] be
reduced by the amount of a Medicare lien."3" The court of appeals
agreed and reversed.3
Allstate argued that UM exposure is calculated by
subtract[ing] the total liability coverage available to the injured party
from the total UM coverage. Because Toomer's UM policy limit was
the same as Rosenberry's liability policy unit, Allstate argued that it
had no UM exposure. Toomer responded that Medicare had paid
approximately $8,600 of her collision-related medical bills and was now
asserting a lien against her settlement with USAA to recover those
payments.32
The court of appeals relied upon the supreme court's decision in
Thurman and held there was "no meaningful distinction" between
Toomer's situation and the facts in Thurman.3 3 In both cases, federal
law required the injured party to repay the benefits provider, resulting
in the injured party retaining an amount less than the party's UM policy
limit.3 4 Allstate argued that Thurman should not apply because there
was no evidence that Toomer had repaid Medicare, but the court rejected
this argument.3 5 The court held that "[wihether Medicare [had] been
or [would] be repaid, and in what amount, [were] questions of fact that
36
the trial court did not, and could not, resolve on a motion to dismiss."
The court held Toomer could take credit for the "reduction" in available
liability limits by the amount of the Medicare lien and seek additional
benefits from her UM insurer.37
Thurman and Toomer were further expanded by the court of appeals
in Adams v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,3s in which
the court left the realm of federal reimbursement rights and held that
a state-created lien for health care also "reduces" a tortfeasor's liability
limits and creates or expands exposure to a UM policy.39 In Adams the
court considered whether a payment made by the tortfeasor's liability

29. Id. at 60-61, 663 S.E.2d at 764.

30.
31.
32.
33.

Id. at 61, 663 S.E.2d at 764.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 63, 663 S.E.2d at 765.

34. Id., 663 S.E.2d at 766.

35.
36.
37.
38.

Id.
Id.
See id. at 61, 663 S.E.2d at 764.
298 Ga. App. 249, 679 S.E.2d 726 (2009).

39. Id. at 249-50, 679 S.E.2d at 727.
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insurer to Grady Hospital to satisfy a lien for services provided to Adams
constituted "payment of other claims" under O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11(b)(1)(D)(ii)4 and, therefore, reduced the maximum amount payable under the
limits of the liability coverage. 4' The court held that the42 payment
constituted the "payment of other claims" under the statute.
The court rejected State Farm's argument that a Georgia lien for
health care is different from a lien created under federal statutes and,
based on the prior decisions in this area, remanded the case to the trial
court with instructions to grant Adams's motion for summary judgment.43 Thus, the court allowed the liability carrier's payment in
satisfaction of the lien to "reduce" the amount of liability coverage
and
44
increase the uninsured motorist coverage exposure pro rata.
Based on the cases already decided, the Authors expect to soon see
decisions further expanding Thurman and its progeny to apply in cases
when medical bills are paid by an employer-provided health insurance
policy (for example, under the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act),45 and possibly when a private health insurer has a right of
reimbursement or subrogation written into its policy. While this
development is consistent with a recent trend to maximize recovery from
UM carriers, it appears to be plainly inconsistent with the Georgia
General Assembly's intent in the UM statute, because no tortfeasor's
liability insurance is truly "reduced" by paying claims for the injured
person's medical care.46 Such payments do not render the tortfeasor
either "uninsured" or "underinsured," as those terms were consistently
understood before Thurman.
3. Stacking and Twisting. The court of appeals will search high
and low for a way to avoid prorating UM policies' priority of coverage.47
So far only one reported decision has allowed UM carriers to prorate
their exposure among policies,4 despite the fact that the standard

40. O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11(b)(1(D)(ii) (2005 & Supp. 2009).
41. Adams, 298 Ga. App. at 250, 679 S.E.2d at 727.
42. Id. at 253, 679 S.E.2d at 729.
43. Id.
44. See id.
45. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2006).
46. See, e.g., Dees v. Logan, 282 Ga. 815, 821, 653 S.E.2d 735, 740 (2007); see also
Bradley S. Wolff et al., Insurance,Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 59 MERCER L. REV. 195,
204-08 (2007); Stephen M. Schatz et al., Insurance,Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 57
MERCER L. REV. 221, 233-37 (2005) (analyzing recovery from UM carriers and indicating
a trend to maximize recovery).
47. See generally Cotter et al., supra note 1, at 202-03.
48. See Dairyland Ins. Co. v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co., 289 Ga. App. 216, 656 S.E.2d

560 (2008).
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insurance policy used in Georgia contains an "other insurance" clause
that provides for proration in the event of multiple policies covering the
same loss.49
The issue arose again in Progressive Classic Insurance Co. v.
Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Co.,' a case involving three policies
covering vehicles owned by members of a family. The underlying case
involved the wrongful death of William Alexander. He was allegedly
killed when he was run over by a vehicle driven by Sterling A. Jackson.
William's parents, Clifford and Judy Alexander, filed the wrongful death
action.51 "Jackson was insured under a Nationwide automobile liability
policy with $25,000 in liability coverage."5 2 William Alexander was the
named insured on a different Nationwide policy with a $300,000 UM
limit. No issue of priority was involved with these two policies. The
three policies in question were: (1) a Nationwide policy listing Clifford
Alexander as the insured with $300,000 in UM coverage; (2) a Nationwide umbrella policy issued to Clifford Alexander with $2 million in UM
coverage; and (3) a Progressive policy with $500,000 in UM coverage
that was initially issued to William Alexander's sister but later amended
to add Clifford Alexander as a named insured and Judy Alexander as an
additional insured.' Clifford Alexander paid the premiums on all three
policies.'4
The two insurers filed cross-motions for summary judgment to
determine the priority of coverage among the three policies. Progressive
argued that the policies should be prorated or, in the alternative, that
its policy should come last in priority. Nationwide argued that
Progressive's policy should come second in line after William's policy
because more family members were named as insureds on the Progressive policy, making William have more connections to it. The trial court
found that the only significant differences among the policies were the
identity of the first named insured and the fact that one policy was an
umbrella policy. The trial court refused to prorate the policies because
it found that the "more closely identified with" test applied. It found
that William was more closely identified with his parent than with his
sister, and the court further held that automobile policies have higher
priority than umbrella policies. The trial court, therefore, determined

49. See FRANK E. JENKINS III & WALLACE MILLER III, GEORGIA AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE LAW app. A, 1029 (2008-2009 ed.).
50. 294 Ga. App. 787, 670 S.E.2d 497 (2008).
51. Id. at 787, 670 S.E.2d at 499.
52. Id.

53. Id. at 787-88, 670 S.E.2d at 499.
54. Id. at 789, 670 S.E.2d at 500.
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that Clifford Alexander's automobile policy would be next in line after
William's own policy, followed by the Progressive policy, and that the
Nationwide umbrella policy would be last in priority. Both insurers
appealed. 55
After reciting the general rule against the proration of stackable UM
coverage and citing the sole case when proration was allowed, the court
of appeals turned to an examination of whether any of the three tests for
determining priority would apply.5" The court of appeals agreed with
the parties that the "receipt of premium" test did not apply because
Clifford Alexander paid the premiums on all three policies."7 The court
then turned to the "more closely identified with" test and agreed with
the trial court that a child is more closely identified with a parent than
with a sibling and that William was therefore more closely identified
with the two Nationwide policies maintained in Clifford Alexander's
name alone than the Progressive policy initially issued to his sister.58
The court disagreed with the trial court, however, about whether
umbrella policies must always come after automobile liability policies in
priority.5" Instead, the court held that after its decision in Abrohams
v. Atlantic Mutual Insurance Agency,' an umbrella policy provides UM
coverage just like any other policy subject to O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11.61
However, the Nationwide umbrella policy specifically required the
insured to maintain an underlying policy with certain UM limits and
62
provided that its coverage would be in excess of the underlying policy.
Therefore, the court held that the Nationwide umbrella policy would
follow the Nationwide automobile liability policy in priority and that the
Progressive policy would be last in line.' The court reiterated that the
"other insurance" clauses of UM policies do not affect the application of
the priority tests the court has developed.' Finally, the court quoted
the language of the DairylandInsurance Co. v. State Farm Automobile
Insurance Co.' case that "'[clourts may also look to other insurance
clauses in the contracts for resolution of the priority issue,'" but the

55. Id. at 788-89, 670 S.E.2d at 499-500.
56. See id. at 789, 670 S.E.2d at 500.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 789-90, 670 S.E.2d at 500.
59. Id. at 790, 670 S.E.2d at 501.
60. 282 Ga. App. 176, 638 S.E.2d 330 (2006).
61. O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11 (2000 & Supp. 2009); ProgressiveClassic, 294 Ga. App. at 790,
670 S.E.2d at 501 (citing Abrohams, 282 Ga. App. at 181, 638 S.E.2d at 334).
62. Progressive Classic, 294 Ga. App. at 791, 670 S.E.2d at 501.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. 289 Ga. App. 216, 656 S.E.2d 560 (2008).
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court disapproved of this language to the extent of any conflict with this
case.

66

When UM policies are issued to a corporation, may an employee of the
corporation stack UM coverage under multiple policies when injured in
an accident while driving one of the corporation's insured vehicles?
According to the court of appeals decision in Staton v. State Farm
Automobile Insurance Co.,67 the answer might depend on the "reasonable expectations" of the insured, even when the "insured" is the injured
employee.6
Staton was injured when his vehicle was hit by an underinsured
driver. Staton's vehicle was owned by his employer, Smyth & Helwys
Publishing, Inc. (S&H).
Staton was an officer and the majority
shareholder of the corporation. S&H insured the vehicle Staton was
driving, as well as two other vehicles it owned, under three separate
State Farm insurance policies that each included UM coverage of
$100,000 per person. Staton sought to stack the UM coverage of the
three policies to provide him with $300,000 in UM coverage. State Farm
filed a motion for partial summary judgment, arguing that Staton could
only collect under the UM policy covering the vehicle he was using at the
time of the incident because he was not an "insured" under the other
policies for this accident. Staton argued that the policies' definition of
insured was ambiguous and that he might be entitled to coverage under
the rules of contract construction.69
Under O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11(b)(1)(B), there are at least two types of
insureds: "(1) the named insured and persons related to him or her in
a specified way, and (2) persons occupying the insured vehicle at the
time of the incident."70 Typically, this requirement is met by defining
insuredas you, "that is, the named insured, his or her spouse, and their
resident relatives."71 State Farm's policies, however, had a broader
definition of insured, which included

66. Progressive Classic, 294 Ga. App. at 791-92, 670 S.E.2d at 501-02 (alteration in
original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Dairyland,289 Ga. App. at 217, 656
S.E.2d at 562).
67. 294 Ga. App. 208, 669 S.E.2d 164 (2008).
68. See id. at 213, 669 S.E.2d at 168.
69. Id. at 208-09, 669 S.E.2d at 165-66.
70. Id. at 211, 669 S.E.2d at 167; see also O.C.GA. § 33-7-11(b)(1)(B).
71. Staton, 294 Ga. App. at 212, 669 S.E.2d at 167. When a corporation is the named
insured on such a policy, employees of the corporation are not entitled to stack such
policies because they are neither the named insured nor the spouse or family member of
the named insured. Hogan v. Mayor & Aldermen of Savannah, 171 Ga. App. 671, 672, 320

S.E.2d 555, 557 (1984).
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1. the first person... named in the declarations; 2. his or her spouse;
3. their relatives; and 4. any other person while occupying: ... your car
[or a non-owned vehicle)... driven by the first person named in the
declarations or that person's spouse and within the scope of the owner's
consent.72

Person was defined in the policies as a "human being."73 But here, the
only named insured was the corporation, S&H. Because a corporation
is not a human being and can have neither a spouse nor relatives,
Staton argued that the policies should be read to say that the insured
was the first person-that is, human being-reported to State Farm as
a licensed driver of the vehicle-here, Staton.74

The court of appeals

agreed that the policies were susceptible to this construction and the
definition of insured was therefore ambiguous.75
The court then went on to construe the ambiguity against the drafter
(State Farm) and "'in accordance with the reasonable expectations of the
insured.'"76 This construction, of course, led to a determination that
Staton was individually an insured under all three policies and was
entitled to stack their UM coverage because his reasonable expectation
included an understanding that "the UM coverages would stack in the
event of a catastrophic accident, such as occurred in this case."77
Accordingly, the decision of the trial court granting State Farm summary
judgment on this issue was reversed. 8
4. What is a "Renewal Policy"? Under O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11(a), UM
policy limits, by default, are equal to the policy's liability limits unless
79
the insured rejects UM coverage or selects a different coverage limit.
If an insured made an election or rejection of UM coverage in a prior
policy, the carrier is not required to offer the same coverage again or
offer it in different amounts in a "renewal policy.sc But what happens
when a policy (1) is issued by a different but related insurance company,
(2) bears a different policy number, and (3) indicates on the document
72.
73.

Staton, 294 Ga. App. at 210-11, 669 S.E.2d at 166-67.
Id. at 210, 669 S.E.2d at 166.

74.

Id. at 211-12, 669 S.E.2d at 167-68.

75.

Id. at 212, 669 S.E.2d at 168. The court did not explicitly say so, but it must have

implicitly held that any other construction would mean the coverage was illusory because
the named insured did not meet the definition of insured. See id., 669 S.E.2d at 167-68.
76. Id. at 212-13, 669 S.E.2d at 168 (quoting Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Univ. of Ga.
Athletic Ass'n, 288 Ga. App. 355, 357, 654 S.E.2d 207, 210 (2008)).
77. Id. at 213, 669 S.E.2d at 168.
78. Id.

79. O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11(aXl), (3).
80. Id. § 33-7-11(a)(3).
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that it is a renewal policy? In this situation, is an insured who was not
offered a selection or rejection with the new policy entitled to UM
benefits in the default amount equal to the liability limit, or only the
amount of UM coverage afforded under the prior policy issued by the
original insurer? In Zurich American Insurance Co. v. Beasley,sl the
court of appeals held that a policy can be a renewal when the insurer
indicates that it is a renewal and the policy serves the purpose of
continuing the obligation to insure. s2
After an automobile collision, Melvin Beasley sought UM benefits
under his Zurich American Insurance Company policy. In cross-motions
for summary judgment, Beasley and Zurich contested the amount of
coverage. According to Zurich, the renewal policy provided the insured
with $75,000 in UM coverage. Beasley argued that the policy was not
a renewal policy and that Zurich was required to provide $1 million in
coverage because he did not reject the higher amount in writing as
required by O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11(a). The trial court granted Beasley's
motion for summary judgment and denied the motion filed by Zurich.'
The court of appeals reversed.'
The court of appeals determined that "this case turn[ed] on whether
the policy issued by Zurich in September 2003 was a renewal of [a]
policy originally issued by Maryland Casualty in September 2001."'
The original policy issued by Maryland Casualty indicated that it was
a new policy. However, subsequent policies-one issued by Maryland
Casualty and then two issued by Zurich-indicated that they were
renewal policies." The first Zurich policy also had a different number
than the previous Maryland Casualty policies.8 7 The court held that
the language of the insurance contracts was entitled to deference in
determining the parties' intent.' The fact that the name of the insurer
had changed was not dispositive, nor did the fact that the Zurich policy
had a different number or different endorsements automatically make
the policy a new policy rather than a renewal.8 9 Thus, the court
concluded that the policy Zurich issued in 2003 was a renewal and,
accordingly, no new selection or rejection by the insured was required.'

81.

293 Ga. App. 8, 666 S.E.2d 83 (2008).

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. at 10-11, 666 S.E.2d at 85.
Id. at 8-9, 666 S.E.2d at 83-84.
Id. at 9, 666 S.E.2d at 84.
Id. at 10, 666 S.E.2d at 85.
Id.
Id. at 9, 666 S.E.2d at 84.
Id. at 11, 666 S.E.2d at 85.
Id.
Id.

190

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61

B. Coverage Cases Involving "RoadRage" and Other Violent
Incidents
This survey period included several decisions about injuries caused in
vehicle-related incidents when the injuries were not caused directly by
vehicles. In each of the cases, the courts found no insurance coverage
under an auto policy.
In Lancer Insurance Co. v. United National Insurance Co.,91 bad
conduct by two truck drivers resulted in a death and injury to others
and no liability under the motor vehicle policy. In the underlying
incident, Donald Goode was driving a truck on Interstate 75 for his
employer, Dahlonega Transport. He passed a truck driven by William
Porter, who then accelerated and pulled in front of Goode. The truck
drivers continued to trade aggressive maneuvers as they moved along
the highway. When Goode called Porter on the CB radio to complain
about Porter's driving, Porter told Goode to pull over and then stopped
his own truck on the side of the highway. Goode pulled off, stopping in
front of Porter. Goode got out of his truck and walked toward Porter's
vehicle. Porter, however, abruptly pulled back onto the highway,
causing an approaching vehicle to lose control and crash into an
embankment. An occupant of the vehicle, John Werner, was seriously
injured, and his wife was killed in the crash. Werner sued several
entities, including Goode, Dahlonega Transport, and Lancer Insurance
Company, Dahlonega Transport's commercial automobile insurance
carrier. Werner later joined United National Insurance Company,
Dahlonega Transport's general liability carrier, claiming that if the
Lancer policy did not cover the incident, United National's general
liability policy would provide coverage. 2
After settling with Werner with a reservation of the right to litigate
coverage, Lancer then filed a declaratory judgment action against United
National.93 The Lancer commercial automobile policy provided as
follows: "We will pay all sums an 'insured' legally must pay as damages
because of 'bodily injury' or 'property damage' to which this insurance
applies, caused by an 'accident' and resulting from the ownership,
maintenance or use of a covered 'auto.'"'
The parties filed cross
motions for summary judgment to determine whether Lancer's policy
covered the claims, and the trial court granted summary judgment to

91. 294 Ga. App. 261, 668 S.E.2d 865 (2008).
92. Id. at 261-62, 668 S.E.2d at 866.
93. Id. at 262, 668 S.E.2d at 866.
94. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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United National.95 The trial court found coverage under Lancer's policy
because Goode's vehicle was still being "used" at the time of the crash
and because the injuries and death "flowed from and grew out of the
incident between the two tractor-trailer drivers during the use of the
vehicles."'
The court of appeals disagreed.97 The court acknowledged that
Goode's vehicle was being "used" during the interplay between the
drivers.98 At the time of the crash, however, the truck was parked,
Goode was out of the vehicle, and the truck was not being "used" for any
purpose." Therefore, the crash was too remote from the ownership,
maintenance,
or use of the insured vehicle to be covered under the
policy."°
A different road rage incident was at the heart of the court of appeals
decision in Kinzy v. Farmers Insurance Exchange.1 "1 In Kinzy the
court held that injuries sustained from being punched by another driver
(while both drivers were out of their vehicles) did not qualify for UM
coverage because the injuries did not arise out of the ownership,
maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle."0 2
In Thavco Insurance Co. v. Williams,1 3 an unintended gun shot
originating from a parked truck struck the occupant of another vehicle.
Shelly Williams was struck by a stray bullet while in a vehicle in a
parking lot. At another vehicle in the same parking lot, a drug deal had
turned into a robbery attempt, and a gun went off when it was used to
strike one of the participants in the head. Williams and her husband
made claims against the liability insurer of the other vehicle and against
their own UM carrier.1" 4 "Under the terms of both policies, coverage
depended on whether the bodily injury arose 'out of the ownership,
maintenance or use' of the vehicle."" 5 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, like the Georgia Court of Appeals, held
that although the incident may have involved a vehicle, the vehicle's

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id. at 261, 668 S.E.2d at 866.
Id. at 262, 668 S.E.2d at 866-67 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id., 668 S.E.2d at 867.
Id.
Id. at 262-63, 668 S.E.2d at 867.
See id. at 263, 668 S.E.2d at 867.
293 Ga. App. 509, 667 S.E.2d 673 (2008).
Id. at 510-11, 667 S.E.2d at 675.
297 F. App'x 949 (11th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 950.
Id.
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causal connection to the injuries was too remote to find the incident
within the intended coverage of the automobile insurance policies."
III.
A.

COMMERCIAL LIABiLrrY INSURANCE

Contributionof Defense Costs Among Insurers
In St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Valley Forge Insurance

Co.,"07 the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Georgia addressed a dispute between insurance companies regarding
their duty to defend the same insured." Two of the issues in the case
were whether one insurer could seek contribution of defense costs from
another insurer and how defense costs were to be allocated."° The
general contractor for a construction project was the named insured
under St. Paul's commercial general liability (CGL) policy. The general
contractor was an additional insured under Valley Forge's CGL policy.
When an arbitration demand was filed seeking damages related to the
project, St. Paul provided a defense to the general contractor. Valley
Forge refused St. Paul and the general contractor's demand that Valley
Forge provide a defense to the general contractor in the arbitration
because Valley Forge believed that its policy was excess to St. Paul's
policy. St. Paul then sued Valley Forge for a judicial declaration that
Valley Forge had a duty to defend the general contractor, that Valley
Forge must contribute to the cost of defending the general contractor,
and that Valley Forge must reimburse St. Paul for an equitable amount
of the defense costs it incurred in defending the general contractor."0
After concluding that Valley Forge had a duty to defend the general
contractor under its policy (because it was not a true "excess policy"), the
court addressed an issue of first impression under Georgia law: whether
Georgia recognizes a cause of action by one insurer for contribution of
defense costs against another insurer."' While Georgia courts have
recognized the rights of an insurer to seek contribution from another
insurer for the cost of indemnifying on behalf of an insured under its
policy, they have not done so with respect to the cost of defense."'
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia
previously addressed contribution for defense costs on the basis of

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id. at 951.
No. 1:06-CV-2074-JOF, 2009 WL 789612 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 23, 2009).
See id. at *4.
Id.
Id. at *1-3.
Id. at *8.
Id.
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contract law, holding that an insurer has a contractual duty to defend
its insured, independent of any other insurance coverage that may be
available to the insured."3 Therefore, an insurer cannot seek contribution for its defense costs, "'absent a special contractual agreement to
that effect.'""
After comparing the two lines of reasoning (an
independent duty to defend and right to seek indemnification costs), the
court found "the holdings of the Georgia courts with respect to contribution in indemnity to be the greatest predictors of Georgia law regarding
the right to contribution for defense costs."

115

Therefore, the court

found that St. Paul had a cause of action for contribution of defense costs
against Valley Forge."6 "Absent a right to contribution, an insurer
has no incentive to perform its duty to defend when it knows that the
insured has another primary insurer."" 7
The court was then faced with the question of how to allocate defense
costs between the insurers."' Under the "equal basis" method, the two
insurers would split defense costs equally."9 Under the "defense
follows indemnity" approach, Valley Forge would pay the same
percentage of defense costs as the percentage it would pay for the
insured's indemnity." 9 Under the "time on the risk" method, the
insurers would look at the number of policies in effect over the total
coverage period, determine the period over which both insurers' policies
covered the general contractor, and apportion accordingly.'
After
reviewing the "methods of sharing" clauses in St. Paul's and Valley
Forge's respective policies, 2 ' the court decided that the defense costs
should be allocated on an equal basis. 23
In St. Paul, the court provides a road map for how multiple insurers
should share and allocate defense costs when obligated to defend the
same insured."2 The court also provides a cautionary tale to any
insurer who does not share in the defense, absent solid contractual
grounds for doing so. The court likely was motivated by its perception

113. Id. at *9 (citing Barton & Ludwig, Inc. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md., 570 F.
Supp. 1470, 1472 (N.D. Ga. 1983)).
114. Id. (quoting Barton & Ludwig, Inc., 570 F. Supp. at 1472).
115. Id. at *10.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at *11.
120. Id.
121. See id.
122. Id. at *12-13.
123. Id. at *13.
124. See id. at *11-13.
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of fairness."25 In recognizing a cause of action in Georgia for contribution of defense costs, the court relied upon "principles of equity that
126
underlie the rule of contribution with respect to the ultimate loss."

However, when determining a method for allocation of defense costs, the
court relied
upon "the provisions of the contracts [the insurers] have
127
made."

B.

Additional Insured Coverage Under Excess Policies
In Insurance Co. of Pennsylvania v. APAC-Southeast, Inc.,12 8 the
Georgia Court of Appeals extended additional insured coverage to a
general contractor, APAC-Southeast, Inc. (APAC), under an excess
liability policy, even though the terms of a separate contract between the
general contractor and the subcontractor did not require the subcontractor to obtain excess liability coverage.1 29 In the subcontract, the
subcontractor was required to obtain a commercial general liability
(CGL) policy with policy limits of at least $1 million. The subcontract
also specified that "[aill policies, except for worker's compensation
policies, shall name [APAC] as an additional insured." 3 ' The subcontractor obtained a CGL policy with limits of $1 million that contained an
additional insured endorsement under which APAC would qualify as an
additional insured if the subcontractor was obligated "by written
agreement" to procure such additional insured coverage. The subcontractor also obtained an excess policy with limits of $10 million, although
it was not required to do so under the subcontract. The excess policy
was silent about additional insured coverage but contained a "follow
form" provision, which had the effect of incorporating the additional
insured endorsement of the CGL policy into the excess policy. 1 ' APAC
was sued for injuries arising out of the construction project. The CGL
insurer provided a defense to APAC as an additional insured. The
excess insurer denied that APAC was an additional insured under its
policy because the additional insured endorsement incorporated into its
policy extended additional insured coverage only to the extent the
subcontractor was required to do so "by written agreement." Because
the subcontract did not require the subcontractor to obtain liability
coverage in excess of $1 million, the excess insurer asserted that APAC

125.

See id. at *10.

126.

Id.

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id. at *12.
297 Ga. App. 553, 677 S.E.2d 734 (2009).
Id. at 560, 677 S.E.2d at 740.
Id. at 554, 677 S.E.2d at 736 (second alteration in original).
Id. at 554-55, 677 S.E.2d at 736-37.
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did not qualify as an additional insured under the additional insured
endorsement.'3 2
While the court of appeals agreed that the subcontract did not require
the subcontractor to procure excess liability coverage, it held that the
subcontract required the subcontractor to procure additional insured
coverage on an excess policy if the subcontractor chose in its discretion
to obtain such a policy. 33 The use of the phrase "[aill policies ...

shall

name [APACI as an additional insured" in the subcontract would include
any excess policy and was not limited to the CGL policy the subcontractor was specifically required to obtain."34 The court held that, at a
minimum, the language of the additional insured endorsement was
ambiguous about whether it extended additional insured coverage when
the subcontract did not require the subcontractor to obtain an excess
policy but did require additional insured coverage for any excess policy
that was procured. 135 Therefore, the court resolved the ambiguity in
favor of6extending additional insured coverage to APAC under the excess
13
policy.
This decision is a further example of the pronounced trend by courts
over the last several years to aggressively find additional insured
coverage under a variety of policies and circumstances. 137 To do so,
courts have shown that they will look to agreements and documents
beyond the language of the policy itself to find an intent by the parties
to obtain additional insured coverage.' 38

132. Id. at 556-57, 677 S.E.2d at 737-38.
133. Id. at 557, 677 S.E.2d at 738.
134. Id. at 557-58,677 S.E.2d at 738 (emphasis omitted) (second alteration in original).
135. Id. at 560, 677 S.E.2d at 740.
136. Id.
137. See St. Paul, 2009 WL 789612, at *13 (holding that Valley Forge had a duty to
defend the general contractor as an additional insured because the insurer's decision to
defend the named insured indicated that it believed the claims arguably fell within the
policy and its contention that its policy was "excess" was not a valid ground to deny
coverage); see also Grange Mut. Cas. Co. v. Snipes, 298 Ga. App. 405, 408-09, 680 S.E.2d
438, 441 (2009); BBL-McCarthy, LLC v. Baldwin Paving Co., 285 Ga. App. 494, 502, 646
S.E.2d 682, 688 (2007); Ryder Integrated Logistics, Inc. v. Bellsouth Telecomm., Inc., 277
Ga. App. 679, 684, 627 S.E.2d 358, 363 (2006), rev'd on other grounds, 281 Ga. 736, 736,
642 S.E.2d 695, 696 (2007).
138. See, e.g., Sumitomo Marine & Fire Ins. Co. of Am. v. S. Guar. Ins. Co. of Ga., 233
F. Supp. 2d 1339, 1355 (N.D. Ga. 2004).
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C. No Bad Faith Failureto Settle When No Judgment in Excess of
Limits
In Trinity Outdoor, LLC v. Central Mutual Insurance Co.,"' the
Georgia Supreme Court was asked a certified question from the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia with respect
to "whether an action for negligent or bad faith failure to settle a case
requires that a judgment be entered against an insured in excess of the
can be asserted."14 The supreme court
policy limits before the action
14 1
answered in the affirmative.

Central Mutual provided a defense to the insured after the insured
was sued for injuries when a billboard it owned fell during installation.
The plaintiffs made a demand for the policy limits in Central Mutual's
policy. The insured demanded that Central Mutual accept the settlement to avoid exposure for a verdict in excess of policy limits. Rather
than accept the demand, Central Mutual filed a motion for summary
judgment on the insured's behalf and asserted what it believed were
valid and strong arguments that the insured was not liable. The insured
subsequently agreed to contribute toward the settlement of the case
without Central Mutual's approval and then sought to recover the
amount of its contribution against Central Mutual, alleging that42Central
Mutual breached the policy and refused to settle in bad faith.
Central Mutual's liability policy contained language providing that
Central Mutual would only pay those sums that the insured was legally
obligated to pay, that the insured could not make a voluntary payment
without Central Mutual's prior consent, and that the insured could only
sue to "recover on an agreed settlement or on a final judgment against
an insured obtained after an actual trial."43 When interpreting these
provisions as clearly and unambiguously written, the court held that the
insured made a voluntary payment toward the settlement without
Central Mutual's consent, that the voluntary payment did not constitute
a sum the insured was legally obligated to pay, that the voluntary
payment was not an agreed settlement, and that the payment was not
a final judgment obtained after a trial. 144 Therefore, the court held

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

285 Ga. 583, 679 S.E.2d 10 (2009).
Id. at 583, 679 S.E.2d at 11.
Id.
Id. at 583-84, 679 S.E.2d at 11.
Id. at 585, 679 S.E.2d at 12.
Id. at 585-86, 679 S.E.2d at 12.
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that the insured could not maintain an action against Central
Mutual
145
for bad faith failure to settle in absence of a jury verdict.
The court distinguished its ruling in Southern GuarantyInsurance Co.
v. Dowse, 4 ' in which it held that an insurer who denies coverage and
refuses to defend an action against its insured waives the provision in
the policy preventing an insured from making a voluntary payment
without the insurer's consent. 47 Unlike the insurer in Dowse, Central
Mutual provided the insured with a defense. 4 s Therefore,
the insured
149
was obligated to comply with the terms of the policy.
Although the court answered the certified question presented to it, it
did so on the basis of contract interpretation, without delving into the
history and legal rationale of bad faith failure to settle cases in
Georgia.I"
In light of Trinity Outdoor, so long as the insurer is
providing a defense, the insured cannot settle the case on its own. 5 '
The insured must wait until the case goes to trial to see if the jury
renders a verdict in excess of the policy limits before it has any recourse
against the insurer.152 While this places the insured in an unenviable
position and ties the hands of an insured who believes the case should
be settled and the insurer is refusing to settle in bad faith,5 3 the
"voluntary payment" provision in a policy does "'serve to prevent
potential fraud, collusion[,] and bad faith on the part of insureds.'"'"
D. InsurerEstopped from Noncoverage, But Insured Must Prove
Prejudice
In World Harvest Church, Inc. v. GuideOne Mutual Insurance Co.,

I

the CGL insurer provided a defense to its insured for eleven months
without any reservation of rights before the insurer informed the insured
56
there was no coverage under the policy and withdrew its defense.
It was undisputed that the policy did not provide coverage.' 57 The

145. Id. at 587, 679 S.E.2d at 13.
146. 278 Ga. 674, 605 S.E.2d 27 (2004). For further discussion about the Dowse
decision, see Schatz et al., supra note 46, at 222-24.
147. Dowse, 278 Ga. at 676, 605 S.E.2d at 29.
148. Trinity, 285 Ga. at 587, 679 S.E.2d at 13.
149. See id.
150. See id. at 584-86, 679 S.E.2d at 12.
151. See id. at 587, 679 S.E.2d at 13.
152. See id.
153. See id.
154. Id. at 586, 679 S.E.2d at 12-13 (quoting Dowse, 278 Ga. at 676, 605 S.E.2d at 29).
155. No. 1:07-CV-1675-RWS, 2008 WL 5111218 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 2, 2008).
156. Id. at *1.
157. Id. at *3.
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insured asserted that the insurer was estopped from denying coverage,
though, because it defended the insured without issuing a reservation of
rights. The insurer contended that estoppel cannot be used to create
coverage when coverage does not exist under a contract of insurance." 8
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia
held that an insurer's failure to issue a reservation of rights while
defending the insured with knowledge of defenses to coverage is an
exception to the rule that estoppel cannot be used to create liability
under a policy where no coverage otherwise exists.159 However, for
this exception to apply, the insured must prove that the insurer's
participation in the defense of the insured without a reservation of rights
prejudiced the insured's defense of the suit."8 Because the insured
could not prove any prejudice, the insurer was not estopped from
denying coverage under the policy. 6 '
In finding no prejudice, the court appears to have been influenced by
the fact that the insured was aware of the coverage issue when the
insurer provided the defense, despite the lack of a reservation of
rights. 6 2 The holding in this case demonstrates that estoppel is not
automatic when the insurer defends the insured without issuing a
reservation of rights." The insured must show that it was somehow
prejudiced as a result'"-for example, because the insurer did not
provide as complete a defense as it reasonably should have or because
assigned defense counsel did not provide satisfactory or adequate service.
E. Pollution Exclusion UnambiguouslyApplies to an "Irritant"or
"Contaminant"
As discussed in last year's Annual Survey of Georgia Law, the Georgia
Court of Appeals, in a case of first impression, held that bodily injury
caused by the release of carbon monoxide inside a residence is clearly
and unambiguously excluded by the plain language of the pollution
exclusion in a CGL policy."6
In Reed v. Auto-Owners Insurance
Co.,1 6 the supreme court affirmed, concluding that carbon monoxide

gas was a "pollutant" as defined by the policy-that is, a matter acting
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
286 Ga.
166.

Id. at *2-3.
Id. at *5.
Id.
Id.
See id.
See id.
Id.
Cotter et al., supra note 1, at 196-97 (discussing Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Reed,
App. 603, 605, 649 S.E.2d 843, 845 (2007)).
284 Ga. 286, 667 S.E.2d 90 (2008).
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as an "irritant or contaminant." 167 The majority chastised the dissent
for trying to determine the reasonable expectation of the insured by
exploring-through "extra-textual" sources-the purpose and historical
evolution of the pollution exclusion, instead of focusing on the text of the
exclusion as plainly written.'6 The decision in Reed reflects the trend
of courts to interpret pollution exclusions to apply to various types of
irritants or contaminants, and not only to traditional environmental
pollution. 169
F

ProfessionalServices Exclusion Interpreted Broadly
In Auto-Owners Insurance Co. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.,170
the Georgia Court of Appeals addressed the application of similar
professional services exclusions in two CGL policies.1 7' Both provisions
excluded bodily injury and property damage due to rendering or failing
to render any professional services. The description of professional
services included, but was not limited to, services such as engineering,
drafting, surveying, and supervisory or inspection services. 7 2 The
claimant sued the insureds under the policies for electrical burns
allegedly caused when the supervisor at a construction site miscommunicated to the claimant that a conduit did not contain live wires.1 7 ' The
court held that the professional services exclusion unambiguously
applied to the bodily injury because such injury was related to the
alleged failure to properly supervise and manage the construction
project. 174 A task does not automatically become a "professional

167. Id. at 288, 667 S.E.2d at 92 (internal quotation marks omitted).
168.

Id.

169. Kruger Commodities v. U.S. Fid. & Guar., 923 F. Supp. 1474, 1479 (M.D. Ala.
1996) ("[T]he overwhelming majority of courts have found [an absolute pollution exclusion]
to bar coverage for all types of pollution claims."); see also Nat' Elec. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Gulf
Underwriters Ins. Co., 162 F.3d 821, 823 (4th Cir. 1998) (welding fumes); U.S. Liab. Ins.
Co. v. Bourbeau, 49 F.3d 786, 787 (1st Cir. 1995) (lead paint); Nova Cas. Co. v. Waserstein,
424 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1334 (S.D. Fla. 2006) (living organisms, microbial populations,
airborne and microbial contaminants, and indoor allergens); Gulf Ins. Co. v. Holland, No.
1:98-CV-774, 2000 WL 33679413, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 3, 2000) (chlorine gas); E. Quincy
Servs. Dist. v. Cont'l Ins. Co., 864 F. Supp. 976, 977, 979 (E.D. Cal. 1994) (e. coli and other
sewage-borne bacteria); Larson v. Composting Concepts, Inc., No. A07-976, 2008 WL
2020489, at *1 (Minn. App. May 13, 2008) (living organisms, mold, bacteria, and
bioaerosols from a composting site); Landshire Fast Foods of Milwaukee, Inc. v. Employers
Mut. Cas. Co., 676 N.W.2d 528, 532 (Wis. App. 2004) (listeria monocytogenes bacteria).
170. 297 Ga. App. 751, 678 S.E.2d 196 (2009).
171. See id. at 753, 678 S.E.2d at 199.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 752-53, 678 S.E.2d at 198-99.
174. Id. at 755, 678 S.E.2d at 200.
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service" because it is performed by a professional; instead, "the task
must arise out of the acts specific to the individual's specialized
knowledge or training."175 Moreover, the proper inquiry is not whether
the insured actually drew upon his professional knowledge, experience,
and training, but whether the insured should have done SO.' 76 Because
the construction supervisor should have drawn on his knowledge,
experience, and training to determine if the conduit contained live wires,
his conduct was an excluded professional service. 77
In Auto-Owners the court provides welcomed guidance for how the
professional services exclusion should be interpreted, particularly with
respect to insureds involved in construction. The decision potentially
broadens the application of the exclusion to a variety of entities who are
sued because they made incorrect decisions by drawing on or failing to
draw on their specialized knowledge. Such insureds would need to
obtain professional liability insurance to provide a layer of coverage for
those scenarios under which their CGL policy will not apply.
G. Another Year, Another Notice Decision
It would not be an annual survey if there was not at least one decision
addressing the insured's duty to comply with the notice provision in an
insurance policy. In Tinity UniversalInsurance Co. v. Georgia Casualty
& Surety Co.,' 78 the CGL policy contained the standard notice condition, requiring the insured to provide prompt notice to the insurer of an
occurrence, claim, or suit.'79 The policy also contained an endorsement
stating that the insured's rights afforded under the policy "shall not be
prejudiced if you fail to give us notice of an occurrence, offense, claim or
suit solely due to your reasonable and documented belief that the bodily
injury or property damage is not covered under the policy." 80 The
insured received a letter from a claimant indicating that equipment
manufactured by the insured caused a fire that resulted in significant
damages. The insured did not forward the letter to its insurer until
approximately six months after receiving it because the insured did not
think it was liable for the loss.'
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia
held that the insured breached the notice condition as a matter of law

175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Id. at 756, 678 S.E.2d at 201.
Id. at 757, 678 S.E.2d at 201.
Id.
No. 1:08-CV-1332-JOF, 2009 WL 1174659 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 28, 2009).
Id. at *1.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at *1-2.
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and, therefore, was not entitled to coverage under the policy."8 2 The
letter from the claimant was sufficient to notify "a reasonable person
that an 'occurrence' had occurred which necessitated action." 1" The
court further found that the endorsement in the policy did not excuse the
insured from providing timely notice because the insured did not have
a reasonable and documented belief that the alleged fire was not covered
under the policy."M Instead, the insured's sole excuse for not providing
timely notice was its belief that it was not liable for the fire."
Generally, an insured is not justified in failing to provide prompt notice
6
by claiming it determined that it had no liability for the incident.'8
The holding in Trinity UniversalInsurance Co. once again stresses the
importance of an insured quickly notifying its insurer of an occurrence
when it receives a letter from a potential claimant indicating that the
insured's conduct has caused damages or injuries. The insured's belief
that it is not liable for the damages or injuries is not a viable legal
An endorsement similar to the one
excuse for not providing notice.'
contained in the policy in Trinity Universal Insurance Co. will likely be
upheld as providing a contractual excuse for not providing notice, but
only if the insured can adequately prove that its failure to provide notice
was due solely to its reasonable and documented belief that the policy
did not provide coverage for the incident."s
IV.

CONDOMINIUM INSURANCE

In House Bill 1121,89 the Georgia General Assembly rewrote the
insurance requirements for condominium associations."s Among the
pertinent changes are the doubling of the liability limits to $1 million
per occurrence and $2 million aggregate, and mandating coverage on
certain defined common elements regardless of the actual legal
boundaries of the particular condominium units.' 9' These changes
represent further maturing of the condominium concept in Georgia.

182.
183.
184.

Id. at *6.
Id. at *5.
Id. at *6.

185. Id.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

Id. at *5.
See id. at *6.
See id.
2008 Ga. Laws 1030 (codified at O.C.GA § 44-3-107 (1991 & Supp. 2009)).
See id.
Id. § 1.
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V. HOMEOWNER'S INSURANCE
In Perry v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.,192 the Georgia Court of
Appeals again emphasized the distinction between an "accidental
occurrence" and an "accidental injury." 9"' The facts underlying this
court's analysis included a sexual assault undertaken at the perpetrator's home after he had been drinking alcohol. The victim sued for
battery, invasion of privacy, loss of consortium, and punitive damages.
In an amended complaint, the victim also alleged that the insured's
voluntary intoxication caused the insured to fail to take reasonable steps
to ensure that the plaintiff consented."9 This claim arguably would
have deprived the perpetrator of the requisite intent-hence, making his
conduct merely "negligent conduct."9 5 State Farm's policy provided
coverage for an "occurrence," defined in the policy as "an accident."196
Though accident was not defined in this policy, settled Georgia law
provides that an accident must be "'an event which takes place without
one's foresight or expectation or design.'"19 The court stressed what
such a policy covers-namely, "bodily injury 'caused by' an accidental
occurrence."' 98 The focus is on the nature of the occurrence-not the
injury-because an accidental injury is one that is unexpected and may
(and often does) arise from a conscious, voluntary act.' 99 Whether the
analysis concerns a construction defect, fight, or sexual tort (such as in
this case), the proper focus is on the accidental nature of the event, not
the particular injury, which may or may not have been anticipated or
intended. 2" The court easily dismissed the insured's eleventh-hour
attempt to obscure his admitted intent to do the act because the insured
had previously admitted intent. 20 ' This opinion is consistent with a
steady line of Georgia precedent and clarifies that the proper focus for
the evaluation
of an occurrence vel non is on the nature of the event, not
20 2
the injury.

192. 297 Ga. App. 9, 676 S.E.2d 376 (2008).
193. Id. at 11, 676 S.E.2d at 378.
194. Id. at 9-10, 676 S.E.2d at 377.
195. See id.
196. Id. at 11, 676 S.E.2d at 378.
197. Id. (quoting Crook v. Ga. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 207 Ga. App. 614, 614, 428
S.E.2d 802, 803 (1993)).
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. See id. at 11-12, 676 S.E.2d at 378-79.
201. See id. at 12, 676 S.E.2d at 379.
202. See id. at 11 & n.15, 676 S.E.2d at 378-79 & n.15.
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In Mason v. Allstate Insurance Co., 203 a case of first impression
concerning the meaning of in connection with the residencepremises, the
court of appeals examined persuasive precedent nationwide and
reviewed two earlier court of appeals opinions consistent with its
ultimate holding, but which did not explicitly deal with the "in
connection with" policy languageO° In Mason several birthday party
guests were injured in an all-terrain vehicle (ATV) accident occurring in
a field fifteen miles from the insured premises. The insureds had
previously used the field to ride the ATV and to fish and hunt. They
had no ownership interest in the property. °5 The Allstate policy
contained an exclusion typically found in policies, which excluded the
use of "'any motor vehicle designed principally for recreational use off
public roads' when 'that vehicle is owned by an insured person and is
being used away from an insured premises.'"2° The term premises
included "the residence premises" and "any premises used by an insured
in with
person inconnection
the residencepremises."207
The court noted its prior decisions in Georgia Farm Bureau Mutual
Insurance Co. v. Huncke2 °s and McCullough v. Reyes,
which involved occurrences on premises that had no ties to the insured premises
and were some 400 and 200 yards away, respectively. 210 The court
proceeded to review persuasive precedent involving all manner of
vehicles and occurrences at locations not immediately adjacent to the
insured premises, all of which failed to connect those physically separate
locations despite pleas of connected activities. 2" The court found it
unnecessary to adopt the most severe of these tests-whether the
premises were "integral to the use,"21 2-adopted by the Massachusetts
Appeals Court in MassachusettsPropertyInsurance UnderwritingAss'n
v. Wynn. 213 Because the property was neither adjacent to the insured
premises nor owned or leased by the insureds, it did not qualify as being
connected with the residence premises."' A possible rationale for the
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298 Ga. App. 308, 680 S.E.2d 168 (2009).
See id. at 311-12, 680 S.E.2d at 171-72.
Id. at 309-10, 680 S.E.2d at 170.
Id. at 311, 680 S.E.2d at 171.
Id.
240 Ga. App. 580, 524 S.E.2d 302 (1999).
287 Ga. App. 483, 651 S.E.2d 810 (2007).
Mason, 298 Ga. App. at 312-13, 680 S.E.2d at 172.
Id. at 313-16, 680 S.E.2d at 172-75.
Id. at 316, 680 S.E.2d at 174.
806 N.E.2d 447, 452 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004).
Mason, 298 Ga. App. at 316, 680 S.E.2d at 174.
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court's ruling was concern over how to regulate premises other
than "the
215
residence premises" with a test other than a proximity test.
In Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Kim,2 16 by intentionally
underpleading the character of the conduct alleged, the insured was able
to secure a defense, given Georgia's liberal duty to defend law, which
favors the insured.217 Kim was alleged to have "unlawfully, intentionally, and without provocation or justification" thrown an ice cream
scooper at the plaintiff in a karaoke bar.21 An amendment followed,
watering down the allegation to negligence.219 While noting "the
potential for abuse" whereby amendments alleging mere negligence could
conceivably bring in every loss,22 the Georgia Court of Appeals
declined to examine the bona fides of the changes and held that "'[an
insurer's duty to defend is determined by comparing the allegations of
the complaint with the provisions of the policy.'" 22 ' By so doing here,
there was a duty to defend.222 The potential for abuse invites a
challenge to a hard-and-fast rule that encourages underpleading.
Ironically, another division of the opinion found that punitive damages
might well be covered under the standard damages definition employed
in most similar policies, which does not expressly exclude punitive
damages.22 3 Though the gravamen of the amended complaint was
limited to negligence rather than intentional conduct,2 24 punitive
damages are often awarded for intentional conduct, albeit down to a
conscious indifference to the consequences at times.
Contractual suit limitations in policies continue to be topics of
litigation. In Morrill v. Cotton States Mutual Insurance Co.,225 the
court of appeals decided that the two-year limitation on legal action
would only be applied to policies written or renewed on or after June 20,
2006, and not to policies written before that date.226 The court also
rejected the argument of waiver by conduct during negotiations, noting

215. See id.
216. 294 Ga. App. 548, 669 S.E.2d 517 (2008).
217. Id. at 551-52, 669 S.E.2d at 520.
218. Id. at 549, 669 S.E.2d at 519 (internal quotation marks omitted).
219. Id. at 550, 669 S.E.2d at 519.
220. Id. at 552 n.3, 669 S.E.2d at 520 n.3.
221. Id. at 551, 669 S.E.2d at 520 (quoting Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Univ. of Ga.
Athletic Ass'n, 288 Ga. App. 355, 356, 654 S.E.2d 207, 209 (2008)).
222. Id. at 551-52, 669 S.E.2d at 520.
223. Id. at 554, 669 S.E.2d at 522.
224. See id. at 551-52, 669 S.E.2d at 520.
225. 293 Ga. App. 259, 666 S.E.2d 582 (2008).
226. Id. at 261, 666 S.E.2d at 584; see also GA. CoMP. R. & REGS. 120-2-19-.01 (2006)
(noting effective date of amendment was June 20, 2006).
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that mere negotiation for settlement was insufficient to constitute
waiver.227 Rather, the insured must "'show that negotiations for a
settlement [had] led the insured to believe that the claim would be paid
by the insurer, without a suit.'"2 s Here, the insured was expressly
informed, months before the expiration of the time period, that the claim
would not be paid.' Of procedural importance was the court's holding
that merely failing to assert the contractual defense in the answer or in
the pretrial order did not constitute a waiver.2
In the context of crop insurance, in Bullington v. Blakely Crop Hail,
Inc.,23' the court of appeals examined whether an arbitration proceeding constituted "legal action" for purposes of a twelve-month suit
limitation clause.1 2 The insured initially claimed Georgia's six-year
statute of limitations for actions on simple contracts in writing, found in
O.C.G.A. § 9-3-24,2 3 governed his claim for crop insurance benefits.'
The court easily rejected that argument, reasoning it well
established that an insurance policy can place a shorter time limitation,
thereby trumping the general statute of limitations in Georgia. r
However, due to a determination of the Risk Management Agency of the
United States Department of Agriculture, which broadly defines legal
action as both litigation and arbitration, 6 the court held that the
initiation of arbitration within the one-year legal action limitation was
sufficient to allow Bullington's claim to proceed. 7
VI.

LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE

A.

Rescission by Insurer
In American General Life Insurance Co. v. Schoenthal Family,
LLC,"8 the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
clarified the terms upon which an insurer could rescind under O.C.G.A.

227. Morrill, 293 Ga. App. at 263, 666 S.E.2d at 585.
228. Id. at 262, 666 S.E.2d at 585 (alteration in original) (quoting Ga. Farm Bureau
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Nolan, 180 Ga. App. 28, 29, 348 S.E.2d 554, 555 (1986)).
229. Id.
230. Id. at 263, 666 S.E.2d at 585-86.
231. 294 Ga. App. 147, 668 S.E.2d 732 (2008).
232. See id. at 150, 668 S.E.2d at 735.
233. O.C.G.A. § 9-3-24 (2007).
234. Bullington, 294 Ga. App. at 150, 668 S.E.2d at 735.
235. Id.
236. U.S.DA FAD-013 (Apr. 23, 2002), available at http'//www.rma.usda.gov/regs/
533/fad-013.html.
237. Bullington, 294 Ga. App. at 151, 668 S.E.2d at 736.
238. 555 F.3d 1331 (11th Cir. 2009).
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§ 33-24-7(b), 239 an independent basis of rescission from that contained
in the text of the policy. 24 ° The insured misrepresented his net worth
to be $10.7 million when it was actually $160,000, and his annual
income to be over $150,000 when it was actually $7200. The eighty-two-year-old applicant was helped in securing this policy by various entityplaintiffs that worked together to finance what the insured would
otherwise have been unable to afford, reserving for themselves the vast
majority of the expected payout.2"
The beneficiaries argued that
American General was required to prove actual reliance on the
misrepresentation.2 42
The Eleventh Circuit, however, held that the test for material
misrepresentation under this code section was objective; the test was
"'one that would influence a prudent insurerin determining whether or
not to accept the risk, or in fixing a different amount of premium in the
event of such acceptance. ' "3

The Eleventh Circuit upheld the district

court's finding of materiality and reliance on the Swiss Re Underwriting
Guidelines, 2 " viewed as "a model of reasonable insurance practices,"
and the uncontroverted testimony of an expert witness. 2" The court
held that O.C.G.A. § 33-24-7(b) provides an entirely independent basis
for rescission, apart from permissive statements of an insured in the
actual contract. 246 Additionally, consistent with controlling Georgia
law, the court held that American General's initial prayer to implead the
policy premium alleviated the need to immediately tender the returned
premium, and hence, its retention for eighteen months (until receiving
court permission to deposit the funds) did not constitute waiver.2 7
B.

InterpleaderActions
Insurers faired well in interpleader actions this survey period. In
American General Life & Accident Insurance Co. v. Vance, 24 8 the
Georgia Court of Appeals upheld the insurer's right to use O.C.G.A.

239.

O.C.G.

§ 33-24-7(b) (2005).

240. See Schoenthal, 555 F.3d at 1335.
241.

Id. at 1336.

242. Id. at 1340.
243. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Lively v. S. Heritage Ins. Co., 256
Ga. App. 195, 196, 568 S.E.2d 98, 100 (2002)).
244. These guidelines are only available to Swiss Re clients. See Swiss Re Guidelines,
http://www.swissre.com/pws/business%20services/reinsurance/life%20and% 2 0health/
underwriting/guidelines/guidelines.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2009).
245. Schoenthal, 555 F.3d at 1340-41.
246. Id. at 1341.
247. Id. at 1342.
248. 297 Ga. App. 677, 678 S.E.2d 135 (2009).
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§ 23-3_90249 to interplead claims over which the insurer was a disinterested stakeholder.2 ' The court reasoned that interpleader is remedial
in nature and, therefore, should be liberally construed." l
Alice Vance's policy during her marriage listed her husband, Cornelius, as the beneficiary. But after their divorce, Alice and Cornelius
made competing claims to ownership of the policy and for reimbursement
of premiums. American General filed an interpleader requesting that it
be discharged and that Alice and Cornelius be left to resolve their
dispute amongst themselves. In the process, Cornelius filed a counterclaim against American General and claimed this made American
General something other than a disinterested stakeholder and, therefore,
made the interpleader action infirm. 2 5 2 The court of appeals reviewed
the text and remedial purpose of O.C.G.A. § 23-3-90, which states that
a disinterested holder of property in dispute need not decide close
questions amongst competing claimants; rather, the holder may
interplead the contested property and leave the competing claimants to
litigate ownership.25 3 This opinion enforces the remedial nature of the
Georgia interpleader statute.
Likewise, in National Life Insurance Co. v. Alembik-Eisner,25 4 the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia allowed
a life insurance carrier to use the federal interpleader action so that the
competing claimants could resolve their disputes. 5
The carrier
received reimbursement of all its attorney fees and expenses in bringing
the interpleader action.255
Abraham Madenfrost applied for a life insurance policy from National
Life in January 1990, the proceeds of which were to be paid into a family
trust. Over the next fifteen years, there were various and sundry
changes in the personal circumstances of several potential beneficiaries,
some of whom lived in foreign countries. One of the beneficiaries,
Victoria Alembik-Eisner, in September 2006 made a demand for
payment of the funds, despite a lack of clarity regarding a notice of
revocation from Madenfrost and the possibility of Madenfrost having
additional children. Hence, National Life, faced with claims of multiple
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252.
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256.

O.C.G.A. § 23-3-90 (1982).
Vance, 297 Ga. App. at 678, 678 S.E.2d at 136.
Id.
Id. at 677-78, 678 S.E.2d at 135-36.
Id. at 678, 678 S.E.2d at 136.
582 F. Supp. 2d 1362 (N.D. Ga. 2008).
Id. at 1369.
Id. at 1372.
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liability, initiated an interpleader action. The court granted National
Life's request to deposit $273,535.22 into the registry of the court. 7
First, the court held that actual competing claims are not required."
The federal interpleader statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1335, 26 9
provides that interpleader can be used when "[t]wo or more adverse
claimants, of diverse citizenship ...

are claiming or may claim to be

entitled to such money or property."'
There must be some real and
reasonable fear of exposure to double liability, and the court found that
National Life had been faced with four competing claimants, which
required National Life to interpret at its peril the meaning of the Trust
document regarding the validity of the claimed revocation and to
determine whether there were additional concerned offspring. 261 The
fact that during the course of the litigation factual developments allowed
these determinations to be made did not alter the fact that National Life
had bona fide concerns at filing, using foresight, about possible double
exposure. 2 2 Hence, jurisdiction was proper under the federal interpleader statute.'
The court also considered how the interpleader
action interacted with state law bad faith claims, noting that the "filing
of the interpleader action does not 'immunize' [an] insurer from state law
[bad faith] counterclaims." 2"
Here, however, there was a factual
failure of the bad faith claim.2 ' The court reviewed the Georgia
courts' standard analysis of Georgia's insurance bad faith statute,
O.C.G.A. § 33-4-6,2' and stated that "'[a]lthough the question of good
or bad faith is ordinarily for the jury, the insurer is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law if it has reasonable grounds to contest the claim or
the question of liability is close.'"267 The court, having found that
National Life did not act in bad faith in filing the interpleader action,
likewise held that the carrier did not act in bad faith in refusing to pay
without a determination from the court as a result of an interpleader
action.26
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Id. at 1364-65.
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28 U.S.C. § 1335 (2006).
28 U.S.C. § 1335(a)(1).
Alembik-Eisner, 582 F. Supp. 2d at 1367.
See id.
Id. at 1369.
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Id. at 1371.
O.C.G.A. § 33-4-6 (2000 & Supp. 2009).
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As a practical matter, a well-pled interpleader should work to free a
carrier from further pursuit by the combatants. These interpleader
opinions add to a continuing body of law upholding the use of interpleader actions in bona fide situations of uncertainty faced by carriers.
C. Class Actions
In Fortis Insurance Co. v. Kahn,269 the Georgia Court of Appeals
afforded the trial court's determinations considerable deference in
upholding class certification when the plaintiffs alleged that the
defendants had misrepresented their insurance policies to be group
insurance policies even though each one of these separate policies was
in fact an individual poicy.27 0 Daniel Kahn, like other class members,
sought to procure health insurance on a group basis from his agent.
Upon renewal of his policy (as well as the policies of each of the other
5757 Georgia policyholders who were issued the same type of insurance),
the premium was not based upon group experience, but rather upon his
own. Hence, Kahn's quarterly premiums went from $833.55 to $1736.43,
even after he cancelled his family coverage. When the trial court
certified the class, this appeal ensued.271
On appeal, multiple attacks on the trial court's finding of commonality
under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-23272 were rejected.2 73 The insurer argued
that the reliance aspect of misrepresentations was an individual
determination which could not be made with respect to a class as a
whole.274 While seemingly agreeing that oral misrepresentations
should be so treated, the court of appeals upheld the trial court's finding
that uniform written misrepresentations regarding the policy, coupled
with class-wide circumstantial evidence that renewals were based
thereon, properly made this a common question of fact. 275 Next, the
insurer argued that differing defenses would defeat the commonality
requirement, noting that class representative Kahn knew of his fraud
claim as of March 1998 and might be time barred by the four-year
statute of limitations. 7 ' The court of appeals, relying on precedent
from the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held
that slightly differing defenses do not necessarily destroy commonality,
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No. A09A0486, 2009 WL 1532515 (Ga. App. June 3, 2009).
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Id. at *1-2.
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and it is sufficient that a "'constellation of common issues binds class
members together.' 27 7 Lastly, the court rejected the insurer's claim
that individualized proof made the class unmanageable.27
This
argument dealt with proof of injury and damages.279 Here, the insurer
was caught by its own uniform assessment of renewal premium
increases on all policyholders in seventeen states, without even looking
at each policyholder's individual characteristics. It now argued that
individual assessments were required in each case.2" The trial and
appellate courts were satisfied with the uniform methodology proposed
for calculating damages and rejected this last argument." 1
The court of appeals wisely noted that class certifications are
inherently tentative and subject to revision and modification as
developments occur.282 However, as a practical matter, class certification often leads to settlement of such cases because the stakes vastly
multiply for the defendant.
VII.

PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY

Though unpublished, in USMoney Source, Inc. v. American International Specialty Lines Insurance Co.,2"3 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit issued a helpful clarifying opinion
about exclusions that arise out of described happenings. In an action in
the United States District Court for the District of Nebraska, USMoney
was found liable for negligence and breach of contract because of its
failure to repay loans to TierOne. The Nebraska court entered a
judgment in the amount of $1,625,630.71.2&
USMoney filed this
declaratory judgment proceeding based on its Mortgage Banker/Mortgage
Broker's Errors and Omissions Policy, which excluded coverage for any
claim "arising out of any defective deed or title."'
The Eleventh
Circuit evaluated existing Georgia precedent on the "arising out of"
clause, noting that "[a] claim arises out of a circumstance if, without the
existence of that circumstance, the claim could not exist."286 Two of
the underlying claims could be maintained independently regardless of
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Id. (quoting In re Nassau County Strip Search Cases, 461 F.3d 219, 225 (2d Cir.
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any issue with the title and, hence, were not barred by the "arising out
of" exclusion. 7 The result is helpful to those victims of mortgage
fraud schemes who are searching for resources to defray losses.
VIII.

TITLE INSURANCE

Litigation over mortgage fraud schemes has generally yielded financial
relief for the victims. In Keyingham Investments, LLC v. Fidelity
National Title Insurance Co. ,' the Georgia Court of Appeals demonstrated that the precise words used can be outcome determinative. The
plaintiff-appellant agreed to loan funds to a person it thought was
Michael Shanahan and later received a commitment from Fidelity
National Title to insure the property against defects in title, subject to
certain conditions."
The relevant commitment condition provided
that "[diocuments satisfactory to the Company creating the interest in
the land and/or mortgage to be insured must be signed, delivered[,] and
recorded."29 An imposter forged Shanahan's signature and, hence, the
lenders lost their anticipated security interest still held in the property
by the real Shanahan. Fidelity refused to issue its "long form" title,
which would have covered the loss.29 ' Fidelity claimed that its title
commitment was controlled by Glass v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co.,292
but the title commitment in Glass required the execution by a particular
person. 93 In contrast, Fidelity's commitment only required "[dlocuments satisfactory to the Company," and the company's attorneys found
that the imposter's documents were satisfactory.294 The court emphasized that the very purpose of title insurance is to protect against the
consequences of forgery and, absent clear policy language to the
contrary, that purpose would be fulfilled by the courts.295
In United States v. Shefton, 296 a case of first impression in the
Eleventh Circuit, the court joined the majority of circuits to hold that a
constructive trust can serve as a superior legal interest to invalidate a
criminal forfeiture order.29 7 This mortgage fraud scheme entailed
Stacey Shefton obtaining nearly $800,000 from Long Beach Mortgage
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Company in a scheme that relegated Long Beach's supposed first
security interest to a subordinate one. Attorneys Title Insurance Fund,
Inc. (ATIF) paid under its title policies and pursued Shefton's assets for
repayment (being subrogated to the interests of Long Beach), asserting
a constructive trust against Shefton's properties. In the meantime,
Shefton's properties had been forfeited as a result of criminal proceedings. " 8 This required ATIF to petition, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853
(n)(2), 2 to establish its interest in the properties.'
The Government claimed that the term legal interest, not having been defined by
Congress, should not include a constructive trust that arises from a
voluntary transfer of money. °1 Applying Georgia law, the Eleventh
Circuit held that a constructive trust existed under Georgia law because
Long Beach had been defrauded.0 2 ATIF was not resigned to remission in the discretion of the Attorney General of the United States
because that remedy was not as complete or effective.30

3

The majority

of the federal circuits had held that a constructive trust can, as a
"superior legal interest," invalidate a forfeiture order.'
The Eleventh Circuit considered and rejected the contrary analysis in
United States v. BCCI Holdings (Luxembourg), S.A.,

°5

in which the

United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held
that a constructive trust is merely a remedy in court and not a superior
legal interest in property that existed at the time of the transgression.3" The Eleventh Circuit held that the constructive trust arose
upon the transfer of Long Beach's funds to the perpetrator, Shefton. °7
Contrary to the decision in BCCI Holding, ATIF's interest did not have
to be superior to the Government's interest-only superior to the
"defendant's interest in the forfeited property."3" Thus, the court's
decision in Shefton provides victims of mortgage fraud an additional
opportunity to recoup losses.
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